




























































































































































Countries differ significantly in the way in which they regulate the entry of new businesses.  To
meet government requirements for starting to operate a business in Austria, an entrepreneur must
complete 12 procedures taking at least 154 business days and pay US$11,612 in government fees.  To
do the same, an entrepreneur in Bolivia needs to follow 20 different procedures, pay US$2,696 in fees
to the government and wait at least 82 business days to acquire the necessary permits.  In contrast, an
entrepreneur in Canada can finish the process in roughly 2 days by paying US$280 in government fees
and completing only 2 procedures.
In this paper, we describe the required procedures governing entry regulation, as well as the
time and the cost of following these procedures, in seventy five countries.  We focus on legal
requirements that need to be met before a business can officially open its doors, the official cost of
meeting these requirements, and the minimum time it takes to meet them if the government does not
delay the process.  We then use these data to evaluate three economic theories of regulation.  Our
work owes a great deal to De Soto’s (1990) path-breaking study of entry regulation in Peru.  Unlike
De Soto, we look at the official requirements, official cost and official time -- and do not measure
corruption and bureaucratic delays that further raise the cost of entry.    Pigou’s (1938) now standard
theory of regulation has been recently called the helping hand view (Shleifer and Vishny 1998).  It
holds that unregulated markets exhibit frequent failures, ranging from monopoly power to externalities. 
A government that pursues social efficiency counters these failures and protects the public through
regulation.  As applied to entry, this view holds that the government screens new entrants so as to make
sure that consumers buy high quality products from “desirable” sellers.  Such regulation reduces market2
failures such as low quality products from fly-by-night operators and externalities such as pollution. It is
“done to ensure that new companies meet minimum standards to provide a good or service.  By being
registered, new companies acquire a type of official approval, which makes them reputable enough to
engage in transactions with the general public and other businesses.” (SRI 1999  -- p. 14)  The helping
hand theory predicts that stricter regulation of entry, as measured by a higher number of procedures in
particular, should be associated with socially superior outcomes.
The grabbing-hand view sees the government as less benign and regulation as socially
inefficient. It comes in two flavors.  In Stigler’s (1971) theory of regulatory capture, “regulation is
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”  Industry incumbents
are able to acquire regulations that create rents for themselves, since they typically face lower
information and organization costs than do the dispersed consumers. In this theory, the regulation of
entry keeps out the competitors and raises incumbents’ profits.  Because stricter regulation raises
barriers to entry, it should lead to greater market power and profits rather than benefits to consumers.
A second strand of the grabbing-hand view, which we call the tollbooth view, holds that
regulation is pursued for the benefit of politicians and bureaucrats (De Soto 1990).  Politicians use
regulation to favor friendly firms and other political constituencies, and thereby obtain campaign
contributions and votes.  In addition, “an important reason why many of these permits and regulations
exist is probably to give officials the power to deny them and to collect bribes in return for providing the
permits.” (Shleifer and Vishny 1993, p. 601). 
In principle, the collection of bribes in exchange for release from regulation can be efficient. In
effect, the government can become an equity holder in a regulated firm.  In practice, however, the3
creation of rents for the bureaucrats and politicians through regulation is often inefficient, in part because
the regulators are disorganized, and in part because the policies they pursue to increase the rents from
corruption are distortionary.  The analogy to tollbooths on a highway is useful.  Efficient regulation may
call for one toll for the use of a road, or even no tolls if the operation of the road is most efficiently
financed through general tax revenues.  In a political equilibrium, however, each town through which the
road passes might be able to erect its own tollbooth.  Toll collectors may also block alternative routes
so as to force the traffic onto the toll road.  For both of these reasons, political toll collection is
inefficient.
In this theory,  the regulation of entry enables the regulators to collect bribes from the potential
entrants and serves no social purpose.  “When someone has finally made the decision to invest, he then
is subjected to some of the worst treatment imaginable...In a few cases this treatment consists of
outright extortion: presenting the investor with insurmountable delays or repeated obstacles unless he
makes a large payoff...” (World Bank 1999, Administrative Barriers to Investment in Africa: The Red
Tape Analysis, p. 10).  More extensive regulation should be associated with socially inferior outcomes,
particularly corruption. 
We assess the regulation of entry around the world from the perspective of these three theories
by addressing two broad sets of questions.  First, what are the consequences of the regulation of entry,
and in particular, who gets the rents?  On the helping hand view, stricter regulation is associated with
higher quality of goods and fewer damaging externalities.  On the capture theory, the regulation of entry
is associated with higher profitability of the incumbents.  On the tollbooth view, stricter regulation is
most clearly associated with higher corruption.   4
A second question we examine to distinguish the alternative theories of regulation is which
governments regulate entry?  The helping hand model predicts that governments whose interests are
more closely aligned with those of the consumers, which we  think of as the more representative and
more limited governments, should regulate better. If the regulation of entry serves consumers, then,
other things equal, more representative and limited governments should regulate entry more strictly.  In
contrast, the grabbing hand model predicts that the governments least subject to popular oversight
should pursue the strictest regulations, to benefit either the incumbent firms or the regulators themselves. 
The question of who regulates thus helps to discriminate among the theories.
Our analysis of exhaustive data on entry regulation in 75 countries leads to the following
conclusions.  The number of procedures required to start up a firm varies from the low of 2 in Canada
to the high of 20 in Bolivia, with the world average of around 10.  The minimum official time for such a
startup varies from the low of 2 days to the high of 174 business days, assuming that there are no delays
by either the applicant or the regulators, with the worldwide average of 63 business days.  The official
cost of following these procedures for a simple firm ranges from under 0.4 percent of per capita GDP
to over 2.6 times per capita GDP, with the world-wide average of 34 percent of annual per capita
income.  For an entrepreneur, legal entry is extremely cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive in
most countries in the world.   
In a cross-section of countries, we do not find that stricter regulation of entry is associated with
higher quality products, better pollution records or health outcomes.  Nor is it strongly associated with
higher profitability of firms or survey measures of lack of competition.  But  stricter regulation of entry is
associated with sharply higher levels of corruption, and a greater relative size of the unofficial economy. 5
On the face of it, the evidence on the consequences of entry regulation does not support the helping
hand or the capture theories, and favors the tollbooth view of regulation.
In response, a helping hand theorist could perhaps argue that corruption and a large unofficial
economy are inadvertent consequences of benevolent regulation, and hence cannot be used as evidence
against the helping hand view.  Such inadvertent consequences might obtain as a side effect of screening
out bad entrants (Banerjee 1997, Acemoglu and Verdier 2000), or simply as a result of a well-intended
but misguided transplant of rich-country regulations into poor countries.  Because of this logic, the
question of which countries regulate entry more heavily may be better suited conceptually to distinguish
the alternative theories. 
We find that the countries with more open access to political power, greater constraints on the
executive, and greater political rights have fewer required procedures for entry regulation -- even
controlling for per capita income -- than do the countries with less representative, less limited, and less
free governments.  The per capita income control is crucial for this analysis because it could be argued
that richer countries have both better governments and a lower need for the regulation of entry, perhaps
because they have fewer market failures or better alternative ways of dealing with them.  The fact that
better governments regulate entry less, along with the straightforward interpretation of the evidence on
corruption and the unofficial economy, point to the tollbooth theory: entry is regulated because doing so
benefits the regulators. 
The next section describes the sample.  Section 3 presents our basic results on the extent of
entry regulation around the world.  Section 4 asks who gets the rents from regulation.  Section 5
presents the main results on which governments regulate. Section 6 concludes.2 The major international consulting companies do not have representative offices in a number of
African countries.  Countries in which we were unable to identify local consulting companies to do an
independent study were also excluded from the data set.
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II. Data.
Construction of the Database
This paper is based on a new database describing the regulation of entry by start-up companies
in 75 countries.  We are interested in the steps that an entrepreneur needs to take to begin operating
legally.  We collected data using all available written information on start-up procedures from
government publications, World Bank- and USAID-sponsored studies, and government web pages on
the Internet.  When written sources were unavailable, we directly contacted the relevant government
agencies in each country.  In addition, in seventy-three countries, we have doubled-checked the
accuracy of our data by commissioning an independent report on start-up procedures, time, and cost
from a local consulting company (most often, Price Waterhouse Coopers).  For the remaining two
countries (Georgia and Ukraine) we have double-checked the accuracy of the data through direct
contacts with government agencies.
Our selection of countries was guided by the goal of spanning a wide range of income levels
and political systems.  The choice of countries was also dictated by the availability of reports on
business registration procedures by consulting companies.2  The sample includes nine African countries,
nine East Asian countries including China and Vietnam, three South Asian countries (India, Pakistan,
and Sri Lanka), all Central and Eastern European countries except for Albania and some of the former3 If the Company Law allows for more than one privately owned business form with limited liability, we
choose the more popular business form among small companies in the country.
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Yugoslav republics, seven former Soviet Union republics, ten Latin American countries, five Middle
Eastern countries (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia), and all major developed countries. 
To describe the patterns of regulation across countries and to understand their determinants, we
record all the steps that are officially required for an entrepreneur to obtain all necessary permits and to
notify and file with all requisite authorities. In some countries, entrepreneurs may not bother to follow
official procedures or may bypass them by paying bribes or hiring the services of “facilitators”.  An
entrepreneur in Georgia can start up a company after going through 12 procedures in 70 business days
and paying $270 in fees, or he may hire a legal advisory company that will complete the start-up
process for $450 in 3 business days (World Bank 1999, p. 16).  In the analysis, we use the first set of
numbers.  We do so because we are primarily interested in understanding the structure of official
regulation. 
Regulations of start-up companies vary across regions within a country, across industries, and
across firm sizes.  For concreteness, we focus on a “standardized” firm that an entrepreneur may want
to set up.  It has the following characteristics: it operates in the capital city, it is exempt from industry-
specific requirements (including environmental ones), it does not participate in foreign trade and does
not trade in goods that are subject to excise taxes (e.g., liquor, tobacco, gas), it is a domestically-
owned limited liability company,3 its capital is subscribed in cash (not in-kind contributions), it rents
(i.e., does not own) land and business premises, and it does not qualify for investment incentives. 
Although different legal forms might be used in different countries to set up the simplest firm, to evaluate4The World Competitiveness Report (1999) surveys business people on how important are
administrative regulations as an obstacle to new business.  Our three measures are strongly positively
correlated with their subjective assessments.
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how regulators address the same problem in different countries, we need to look at the same form. 
   Our data almost surely underestimate the cost and complexity associated with entry.4  Start-up
procedures in the provinces are often slower than in the capital.  Industry-specific requirements also
add steps.  Foreign ownership frequently involves additional verifications and procedures. 
Contributions in kind often require assessment of value, a complex procedure that depends on the
quality of property registries.  Finally, purchasing land can be quite difficult and even impossible in some
of the countries of the sample (for example, in the Kyrgyz Republic).
Definitions of variables
We use three measures of entry regulation: the number of procedures that firms must go
through, the official time required to complete the process, and its official cost.  On the helping-hand
theory, a more thorough screening process requires more procedures and demands more time.  On the
grabbing-hand view, more procedures and longer delays facilitate bribe extraction (tollbooth view)
and/or make entry less attractive to potential competitors (capture view).  Theoretical predictions
regarding our measure of cost are ambiguous.  A benevolent social planner who wants to spend
significant resources on screening new entrants may choose to finance such activity with broad taxes
rather than with the direct fees that we measure, leading to low costs as we measure them.  A corrupt
regulator may also want to set fees low in order to raise her own bribe income if, for example, fees are5 Shleifer and Vishny (1993) distinguish corruption with theft from corruption without theft.  In the latter
case, the regulator must remit the official fee to the Treasury, and therefore has no interest in that fee
being high.
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verifiable and cannot be expropriated by the regulator.5  In contrast, higher fees are unambiguously
desirable as a tool to deter entry under the capture theory.  Because of these ambiguities, we present
statistics on cost mainly to describe an important attribute of regulation and not to discriminate among
theories.
We keep track of all the procedures that are required by law to start a business.  A separate
step in the start-up process is a "procedure" only if it requires that the entrepreneur interacts with
outside entities: state and local government offices, lawyers, auditors, notaries, company seal
manufacturers, etc.  For example, all limited liability companies need to hold an inaugural meeting of
shareholders to formally adopt the Company Articles and Bylaws.  Since this step involves only the
entrepreneurs, we do not count it as a procedure.  Similarly, most companies hire a lawyer to draft their
Articles of Association.  However, we do not count that as a procedure unless the law requires that a
lawyer be involved in the process.  In the same vein, we ignore procedures that the entrepreneur can
avoid altogether (e.g., reserving exclusive rights over a proposed company name until registration is
completed) or that can be performed after business commences.
Each office that the entrepreneur visits counts as a separate procedure.  To keep track of the
offices that an entrepreneur is required to visit, we use the "same building” criterion.  That is, we
consider offices in different buildings distinct (although they may be part of the same bureaucratic
structure). For example, a Bulgarian entrepreneur receives her registration certificate from the Company10
Registry, and then has to pay the associated fee at an officially-designated bank.  Even though both
steps are essentially related to "obtaining the registration certificate", they count as 2 separate
procedures.  Visiting the same office counts as two procedures if there have to be other steps in
between.  An entrepreneur in Kazakhstan needs to get a preliminary registration certificate at the
Ministry of Justice.  She then goes to the Statistical Office to obtain a company code, which is used
during her second visit to the Ministry of Justice in the issuance of the actual registration certificate. We
count these as 3 separate procedures.
To measure time, we collect information on the sequence in which procedures are to be
completed and rely on official figures as to how many business days it takes to complete each step. We
adopt a "perfect efficiency" approach when estimating the length of the registration process.  We ignore
the time spent to gather information, and assume that all steps are known from the very beginning. We
also assume that steps are taken simultaneously whenever possible.  Since entrepreneurs may have
trouble visiting several different institutions within the same day (especially if they come from out-of-
town), we set the minimum time required to visit an institution to be one day.  Another justification for
this approach is that the relevant offices are sometimes open for business only briefly: both the Ministry
of Economy and the Ministry of Justice in Cairo are open for business only between 11am and 2pm.
We estimate the cost of entry regulation based on all identifiable official expenses: fees, costs of
procedures and forms, photocopies, fiscal stamps, legal and notary charges, etc.  All cost figures are official
and do not include bribes, which De Soto has shown to be significant for registration. Our cost estimates
also ignore the opportunity cost of the entrepreneur’s time and the foregone profits associated with
bureaucratic delay.  Setup fees often vary with the level of start-up capital.  We report the costs associated11
with setting up a firm with capital of ten times per capita GDP.  We have experimented with other capital
levels and found our results to be robust.  
Table I presents a comprehensive list of all procedures associated with setting up a firm in our
sample.  The steps required by law before a company can legally start operations can broadly be
divided into registration and post-registration requirements. Registration covers all steps necessary for a
company to obtain a registration certificate.  They range from 1-11 procedures, demand from 1 to 120
days, and cost from 0.25% to 210% of per capita GDP.  Post-registration requirements refer to
municipal procedures, industry-level or national-level approvals of the company, filing with the tax and
labor authorities, environmental and zoning procedures, all required once a company has registered but
before it can start operations. These procedures range from 1 to 12 in number, consume up to 138
days, and cost up to 81% of per capita GDP in fees.
The basic procedure in registration, present everywhere, is filing documentation in the
Companies’ Registry.  This can take more than one step; sometimes there is a “preliminary license” and
a “final” license.  Combined with that step, or as a separate procedure, is the check for uniqueness of
the proposed company name.  Add-on procedures comprise the requirements to notarize the Company
Deeds, to furnish proof of deposit of start-up capital, and to publish a notification of the company’s
establishment in an official or business paper.  While there are no differences in the above procedures
across countries, there is large variation in terms of the required time and cost.  In the most efficient
countries, the Companies Registry performs these procedures automatically,  without involving the
entrepreneur in any way.  Additional procedures that require obtaining different certificates and filing
with agencies other than the Registry may add up to 87 days in delays, as is the case in Germany. 12
The basic post-registration procedures, present in almost every country in the data set, are a
local business license and filing with the tax and labor authorities. The latter two procedures per se do
not take a lot of time in any country (up to a week at most), and are usually free of charge.  Add-on
procedures appear in three areas.  The first area covers mandatory municipal procedures, registrations
with statistical offices and with Chambers of Commerce and Industry (or respective Ministries).  In
Mexico, these procedures take up to 7 steps and 63 days.  In this area, procedures that appear to be
redundant show up frequently: “the permit to play music in public” is obligatory for every firm in
Colombia, regardless of whether it contemplates playing music.  The second area covers tax-related
procedures, including the steps mentioned above.  In Brazil, these procedures take up to 5 steps and
13 days.  The final area is labor related procedures, which can take up to 7 steps and 17 days in the
case of Bolivia. 
Figures I and II describe the number of steps, time, and cost of following the procedures
needed to begin operating legally in New Zealand and France, respectively.  New Zealand’s
streamlined startup process takes only three steps and 17 days.  The entrepreneur must first obtain
approval for the company name from the website of the Registrar of Companies, and then apply online
for registration with both the Registrar of Companies and the tax authorities.  
In contrast, the process in France takes 66 days. To begin, the founder needs to check the
chosen company name for uniqueness at the Institut National de la Propriété Industrielle (INPI).  He
then needs the mayor's permit to use his home as an office.  If the office is to be rented, the founder
needs to secure a notarized lease agreement.  The following additional documents must be obtained,
each from a different authority: proof of a clean criminal record, an original extract of the entrepreneur'13
certificate of marital status from the City Hall, and a power of attorney.  The start-up capital is then
deposited with a notary bank or the Deposit and Consignment Office (Caisse des Dépôt), and is
blocked there until proof of registration is provided.  Notarization of the Articles of Association follows. 
A notice stating the location of the headquarters office is published in a journal approved for legal
announcements and evidence of the publication is obtained.  Next, the founder registers four copies of
the articles of association at the local tax collection office.  He then files a request for registration with
the Centre de Formalités des Entreprises (CFE) which handles declarations of existence and other
registration related formalities. The CFE must process the documents or return them within 15 days in
case the request is incomplete.  The CFE automatically enters the company information in the Registre
Nationale des Entreprises (RNE) and obtains from the RNE identification numbers: numero SIRENE
(Systéme Informatique pour le Répertoire des Entreprises), numero SIRET (Systéme Informatique
pour le Répertoire des Etablissements), and numero NAF (Nomenclature des Activitees Francaises).
The SIRET is used by, among others, the tax authorities.  The RNE also publishes a notice of the
company formation in the official bulletin of civil and commercial announcements.  Finally, the firm
obtains proof of registration form "K-bis," which is effectively its identify card. This form is then filed to
unblock the start-up capital.  To start operations legally, the entrepreneur needs to undertake the
following five additional post-registration procedures: inform the post office of the new enterprise,
designate a bondsman or guarantee payment of taxes with a cash deposit, have the firm’s ledgers and
registers initialed, and file for social security.  The magazine L'Entreprise comments: "To be sure that the
file for the Company Registry is complete, many promoters check it with a counselor's service, which
costs FF200 in Paris (about $30).  But there's always something missing, and most entrepreneurs end14
up using a lawyer to complete the procedure."
III. Basic Results. 
Table II describes all the variables used in this study.  Table III presents the basic information
from our sample.  Countries are ranked in the ascending order of the total number of entry procedures,
where the pre-registration and post-registration procedures are added up.  We classify each procedure
as one of five types: safety and health, environmental, tax, labor, and a residual category which we label
“screening,” whose purpose under the helping hand view is presumably to weed out the undesirable
entrepreneurs.  We then compute and report the total number of procedures and their breakdown into
our five categories for each country.  We also report the minimum number of business days that are
officially required to comply with entry regulations and the costs arising from the official fees (as a
fraction of GDP per capita).  Finally, we take averages by income level and report t-tests comparing
the regulation of entry across income groups. 
The data show enormous variation in entry regulation across countries.  The total number of
procedures ranges from 2 in Canada to 20 in Bolivia and averages 10.17 for the whole sample.  Very
few entry regulations cover tax and labor issues.  The world-wide average number of each of labor and
tax procedures is roughly 1.5.  Procedures involving environmental issues and safety and health matters
are even more rare (0.35 and 0.71 procedures on average, respectively).  Instead, much of what
governments do to regulate entry falls into the category of screening procedures.  The world-wide
average number of such procedures facing a new entrant is 6. 6 One objection to this finding is that entrepreneurs in rich countries might face more post-entry
regulations than those in poor countries.  We have collected data on one aspect of post-entry regulation
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The number of procedures is highly correlated with both the time and cost variables (see Table
VI).  The correlation of the (log) number of procedures with (log) time is 0.75 and with (log) cost is
0.62. Translated into economic terms, this means that entrepreneurs pay a steep price in terms of fees
and delays in countries that make intense use of ex-ante screening.  For example, completing 17
procedures demands 55 business days and 12.4% of GDP per capita in Colombia and 174 business
days and 116.4% of GDP per capita in Mozambique. In Italy, the completion of the 11 procedures
takes up 121 business days and 24.7% of GDP per capita.  Bolivia is in a class of its own: completing
its 20 procedures requires 82 business days and fees of at least 2.6 times GDP per capita.  These
figures are admittedly extreme within the sample, yet meeting the official entry requirements in the
average sample country requires roughly 63 days and fees of 34% of GDP per capita.  
   Table III also reports the1997 level of per capita GDP in U.S. dollars.  Panel B reports
averages of the total number of procedures and its components, time and cost by quartiles of per capita
GDP in 1997.  Two patterns emerge.  First, the cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio decreases uniformly with
GDP per capita.  The average cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio for countries in the top quartile of per
capita GDP (“rich countries”) is 10% and rises to 65% in countries in the bottom quartile of per capita
GDP.  This pattern reflects the fact that the income elasticity of fees (in levels) is about 0.5 and does not
have a deeper interpretation.  Second, countries in the top quartile of per capita GDP require fewer
procedures and their entrepreneurs face shorter delays in starting a legal business than those in the
remaining countries.6  The total number of procedures in an average rich country is 7 which isaround the world, namely the regulation of labor markets (see Djankov et al., 2000).  The data show
that the numbers of entry and of labor market regulations are positively correlated across countries,
contrary to the substitutes hypothesis.  
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significantly lower than the sample average of 10 (t-stats are reported on Panel C).  Rich countries also
have fewer tax, labor and even environmental start-up procedures than the rest of the sample. 
Similarly, meeting government requirements requires approximately 43.2 business days in rich countries,
statistically significantly lower than the rest-of-sample mean of 69.3 days.  In contrast, countries in the
other three quartiles of per capita income are not statistically different from each other in terms of the
number of procedures and the time required to fulfill them. 
To summarize, the regulation of entry varies enormously across countries.  It often takes the
form of screening procedures.  Rich countries (i.e., those in the top quartile of per capita GDP) regulate
entry relatively less than do all the other countries.  In principle, these findings are consistent with both
the helping- and grabbing-hand views.  Market failures might be more pervasive in countries with
incomes just below the first quartile of GDP per capita, generating a greater demand for benign
regulation in these countries. Alternatively, income levels may proxy for characteristics of political
systems that allow politicians and/or incumbents to capture the regulatory process for their own benefit. 
In the next two sections, we try to relate these patterns in the data to the helping- and grabbing-hand
theories of regulation.      
IV. Who gets the rents from regulation?7 We have tried measures of air pollution and obtained similar results. 
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Theories of regulation differ in their predictions as to who gets its benefits.  The helping-hand
theory predicts that stricter entry regulation is associated with higher measured consumer welfare.  In
contrast, the grabbing-hand theory sees regulation as a tool to create rents for bureaucrats and/or
incumbent firms.  Stricter regulation should then be associated with higher corruption (tollbooth view)
and/or profitability of incumbent firms (capture view). 
Measuring rents is inherently extremely difficult, especially across countries.  In this section, we
present some measures that we have been able to find that might bear -- albeit quite imperfectly -- on
the relevant theories.  To begin, consider some variables bearing on the helping hand theory.  Note
that these variables reflect the activities of all firms in the country, and not just the entrants.  The first is a
measure of a country’s compliance with international quality standards.  It is a natural variable to focus
on if the goal of regulation is to screen out entrants who might sell output of inferior quality.  Second, we
consider the level of water pollution, which should fall if entry regulation aims to control externalities and
does so successfully7.   Third, we consider two measures of health outcomes that entry regulation
would guard against under the helping hand view: the number of deaths from accidental poisoning and
the number of deaths from intestinal infections (due to reporting practices in poor countries, the second
variable might better capture deaths from accidental poisoning in the poor countries, according to the
World Health Organization.)  Finally, we include two measures of the size of the unofficial economy:
based on estimates of unofficial output and employment, respectively.  Since firms operating unofficially
avoid nearly all regulations, a large size of the unofficial economy in countries with more regulations8There is a large literature detailing how regulation can drive firms into the unofficial economy, where
they can avoid some or all of these regulations.  See, for example, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer
(1997) and Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (2000). 
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would contradict the prediction of the helping hand theory that regulation effectively protects
consumers.8 
Table IV presents the results on these six measures of consequences of regulation using the
number of procedures as dependent variables.  For two reasons, we run each regression with and
without the log of per capita GDP.  First, some of the independent variables are correlated with income
per capita and we want to make sure that we are not picking up the general effects of good governance
associated with higher income.  Second, we use GDP per capita as a rough proxy of the prevalence of
market failures in a country.  In a sense, including per capita income as a control is a crude way to keep
the need for socially desirable regulation constant, which allows us to focus on the consequences (and
later causes) of regulation separately from the need. 
The results in Table IV do not support the helping-hand theory. Compliance with international
quality standards declines as the number of procedures rises. Pollution levels do not fall with regulation
levels.  The two measures of accidental poisoning are not lower in countries with more regulations (if
anything, the opposite seems to be true even controlling for per capita income.)  More regulation is
associated with a larger unofficial economy, and statistically significantly so if we use the unofficial
employment variable.  We have also run these regressions using cost and time as independent variables,
and obtained generally insignificant results. While the data are noisy, none of the results support the
predictions of the helping hand theory.9These profitability numbers refer to public firms, and therefore are very imperfect.  As an alternative,
we measured profitability using the return on World Bank financed projects from the World Bank
Operations Evaluation Department.  Using these data, there is no evidence that more regulations are
associated with greater returns, either. 
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  To assess the capture theory, we have collected two variables: a measure of the return on
assets for publicly-traded firms and a survey measure of “lack of product market competition.”  The
capture hypothesis implies that the profitability of incumbents (proxied by return-on-assets) and the lack
of market competition should be positively associated with the intensity of regulation.  The results in
Table V do not show that firms in countries with more entry regulation are more profitable.9  Also,
controlling for per capita income, competition in countries with more regulations is not perceived to be
(statistically significantly) less intense.  These results, while relying on crude measures and not
contradicting the capture hypothesis, do not provide much support for it either.
A direct implication of the tollbooth hypothesis is that corruption levels and the intensity of
entry regulation are positively correlated.  In fact, since in many countries in our sample politicians run
businesses, the regulation of entry produces the double benefit of corruption revenues and the increased
profitability of the incumbent businesses already affiliated with the politicians.  Figure III presents the
relationship between corruption and the number of procedures without controlling for per capita GDP.
Panel A of Table VI shows statistically that, consistent with the tollbooth view, more regulation is
associated with worse corruption scores.  The coefficients are statistically significant (with and without
controlling for income) and large in economic terms. The results using the cost and the time of meeting
the entry regulations as independent variables are also statistically significant, pointing further to the
robustness of this evidence in favor of the tollbooth theory.20
A way to reconcile these findings on corruption with the helping hand theory is to argue that
regulation may have unintended consequences.  One version of this theory holds that benign politicians
in emerging markets imitate the regulations of rich countries with best intentions in mind, but are stymied
by corruption and other enforcement failures.  This theory is not entirely consistent with our earlier
finding that poorer countries in fact have more entry regulations than rich countries do.  A further
implication of this theory is that regulations should have a bigger impact on corruption in poorer
countries.  Panel B of Table VI addresses this hypothesis by examining separately the relationship
between entry regulations and corruption in countries with above and below world median income. 
The results show that regulations actually have a stronger effect on corruption in the subsample of richer
countries.     
On the second version of the unintended consequences argument, it may be impossible for the
benevolent government to screen bad entrants without facilitating corruption (Banerjee 1997, Acemoglu
and Verdier 2000).  In countries whose markets are fraught with failures, it might be better to have
corrupt regulators than none at all.  Corruption may be the price to pay for addressing market failures. 
We turn next to the evidence regarding the political attributes of countries that regulate to disentangle
the competing theories of regulation.
V.  Who Regulates Entry?
In this section we focus on the political attributes of countries that regulate entry.  These
attributes are intimately related to the competing hypotheses about regulation.  In the helping hand view,
regulation is a tool to remedy market failures.  The implication is that countries whose political systems21
are characterized by higher congruence between policy outcomes and social preferences should
regulate entry more strictly.  In the empirical analysis that follows, we identify such countries with more
representative and limited governments.  In contrast, despotic regimes generally pursue policies aimed
at maximizing the welfare of a few individuals and need not be concerned with market failure.  The goal
of despotic rulers may well be to maximize bribes and profits of a few cronies rather than social welfare
(Olson 1991, DeLong and Shleifer 1993).  On the grabbing hand theory, we expect more
representative and limited government to be associated with lighter regulation of entry.  
We have collected data on a variety of characteristics of political systems, partly because we
want to be flexible regarding the meaning of “good government”.  Where possible, we use variables
from different sources to check the robustness of our results.  Our political variables fall into four broad
groups.  The first includes the de facto independence of the executive and an index of constraints on the
executive.  The second group includes an index of the effectiveness of the legislature and a measure of
competition in the legislature’s nominating process.  The third group includes a measure of autocracy
and one of political rights.  
An additional variable that we focus on, used in the earlier work by La Porta et al. (1998,
1999) is legal origin.  We classify countries based on the origin of their commercial laws into five broad
groups: English, French, German, Scandinavian, and Socialist.  Legal origin has been viewed as a proxy
for the government’s proclivity to intervene in the economy and the stance of the law toward property
rights in a country (La Porta et al. 1999).  Rather than capture the power of the government to
intervene, legal origin may capture its inclination to do so.   22
Correlations among the political variables are presented on Table VII.  The political variables
tend to be strongly correlated within blocks.  For example, the measure of constraints on the executive
power is highly correlated with de-facto independence of the executive (0.8523) and with the
effectiveness of the legislature (0.8711).  Yet, we report results on all three variables as each comes
from a different source.  Similarly, blocks of variables tend to be correlated with each other.  In
particular, democracy tends to be associated with competitive and limited  executive and legislative
branches.  Legal origin, in contrast, tends to be insignificantly correlated with other political variables
(the exception is Socialist legal origin which has obvious correlations with democracy and limited
government). This particular result is consistent with our view that legal origin captures a different aspect
of the political structure than do the other political variables.  Note also that income levels are positively
associated with various measures of democracy as well as with competitive and limited executive and
legislative branches, but not with the legal origin. The fact that countries with severe market failures have
more abusive governments by itself limits the normative usefulness of the Pigouvian model.
In Table VIII, we present the results of regressing our proxies for regulation on a constant and
each of the political variables taken one at a time and the log of per capita income. In interpreting these
regressions, we take the broad political measures of limited and representative government as being
exogenous to the number, time, and cost of entry regulation.  It is possible, of course, that both the
political and the regulatory variables are simultaneously determined by some deeper historical factors. 
Even so, it is interesting to know what the correlation is: does the history that produces good
government also produce a lot or a few regulations of entry?  The control for the level of development
is crucial (and in fact our results without this control are significantly stronger).  Market failures are likely23
to be both more pervasive and more severe in poor countries than in rich ones.  Moreover, our
measures of good government are uniformly higher in richer countries.  Without income controls, our
political variables may be just proxying for income levels.  Imagine, for example, that the consumers in
poor countries are exposed to a larger risk from bad firms entering their markets and selling goods of
inferior quality.  The Pigouvian planner would then need more tools to screen entrants in the poorer
countries.
Holding per capita income constant, countries with more limited and representative
governments have statistically significantly fewer procedures for entry regulation using 5 out of 6
measures of better government (Panel A).  Using time (Panel B) and cost (Panel C) as dependent
variables produces only somewhat weaker results.  These results show that countries with more limited
governments, governments more open to competition, and greater political rights have lighter regulation
of entry even holding per capita income constant.  Figure V plots the number of procedures against the
autocracy score and shows that regulation is increasing in autocracy.  Regulation is heavy in autocratic
countries such as Vietnam and Mozambique and light in democratic countries such as Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the US.
The log of per capita GDP tends to enter these regressions significantly.  The interpretation of
this result is clouded both because there are problems of multicollinearity with the political variables and
because the direction of causation is unclear. Under the grabbing-hand hypothesis, burdensome
regulation is a manifestation of transfers from entrepreneurs and/or consumers that are likely to be
distortionary and, hence, associated with lower levels of income.  Countries may be poor because
regulation is hostile to new business formation. 24
Holding per capita income constant, countries of French, German and Socialist legal origin have
more regulations than English legal origin countries, while countries of Scandinavian legal origin about
the same.  The results that civil law countries (with the exception of those in Scandinavia) regulate entry
more heavily lends further support for the interpretation of the legal origin variables proposed by La
Porta et al. (1999). Governments in civil law countries, especially the French civil law countries, tend to
have a greater proclivity to intervene in economic life, and the evidence on the regulation of entry is
further support of this interpretation.  Note, however, that in itself this evidence does not discriminate
among the alternative theories in the same way as the evidence on democracy does: the French origin
countries might merely be more prepared to deal with market failures than the common law countries.
These results are broadly consistent with the grabbing-hand theory that sees regulation as a
mechanism to create rents for bureaucrats and/or oligarchs.  The grabbing-hand theory predicts that
such rent extraction should be moderated by better government to the extent that outcomes in such
regimes come closer to representing the preferences of the public.  The grabbing hand theory also
predicts that governments with a greater proclivity to intervene and lower security of private property
will regulate entry more heavily.  In contrast, these results are more difficult to reconcile social welfare
maximization unless one identifies it with political systems of countries such as Bolivia, Mozambique, or
Vietnam, where governments are unlimited and property rights insecure.  Of course, these countries
might be doing even worse in the absence of heavy regulation.  Such a possibility strikes us as remote,
especially since we keep the level of development constant in the analysis.25
VI. Conclusion. 
An analysis of the regulation of entry in 75 countries shows that, even aside from the costs
associated with corruption and bureaucratic delay, legal entry is extremely expensive, especially in the
countries outside the top quartile of the income distribution.  We find that heavier regulation of entry is
generally associated with greater corruption and a larger unofficial economy, but not with measures of
better quality of private or public goods.  We also find that countries with less limited, less democratic,
and more interventionist governments regulate entry more heavily, even controlling for the level of
economic development. 
We interpret this evidence in light of the three broad approaches to regulation: the helping hand
model, in which governments regulate entry to cure market failures, the capture model, in which
governments regulate entry to protect the incumbent firms, and the tollbooth model, in which
governments regulate entry to seek political benefits and bribes.  We do not find convincing evidence to
support the capture theory, although our data are probably least suited to test it.  Our results are
difficult to reconcile with the helping hand model, and even with the elaborate versions of this model
which recognize that the generally benevolent regulation may have unintended consequences.  On the
other hand, all the evidence is naturally consistent with the tollbooth version of the grabbing hand model. 
Entry appears to be regulated more heavily by the less attractive governments, and such regulation
leads to unattractive outcomes.  The principal beneficiaries, if any, are the politicians and the
bureaucrats themselves.   26
References
Acemoglu, Daron, and Thierry Verdier, 2000, “The Choice Between Market Failures and Corruption,”
American Economic Review 90, 194-211.
Ades, Alberto, and Rafael Di Tella, 1999, “Rents, Competition, and Corruption,” American Economic
Review 89, 982-993.
Banerjee, Abhijit, 1997, “A Theory of Misgovernance,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 1289-
1332. 
Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook, published online, various years.
Chidzero, Anne-Marie, “Senegal” in Webster, Leila, and Peter Fidler, Editors, 1996, "The Informal
Sector and Microfinance Institutions in West Africa," The World Bank, Washington DC.
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, and Daniela Klingebiel, 2000, “Stock Markets in Transition 
Economies,” World Bank Financial Sector Discussion Paper no. 5.
DeLong, J. Bradford and Andrei Shleifer, 1993, “Princes and Merchants: European City Growth
Before the Industrial Revolution,” Journal of Law and Economics 36, 671-702. 
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 2000, “The
Regulation of Labor,” manuscript in preparation. 
De Soto, Hernando, 1990, The Other Path, New York: Harper and Row. 
Friedman, Eric, Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, 2000, “Dodging the
Grabbing Hand: the Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries,” Journal of Public
Economics 76, 459-494. 27
Johnson, Simon, Daniel Kaufmann, and Andrei Shleifer, 1997, “The Unofficial Economy in Transition,”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Washington, D.C. 
Kasnako￿lu,  Zehra, and Münür Yayla, “Unrecorded Economy in Turkey: A Monetary Approach”,
1999.  "Unrecorded Economy in Turkey (A Monetary Approach)" in Informal Sector  in
Turkey (I), Tuncer Bulutay (ed.), SIS, Ankara, forthcoming.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1998, “Law
and Finance,” Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113-1155.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1999, “The
Quality of Government,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15, 222-279.
Olson, Mancur, 1991, “Autocracy, Democracy, and Prosperity,” in Richard Zeckhauser, ed., Strategy
of Choice, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Pigou, Arthur C., 1938, The Economics of Welfare, 4th ed., London:Macmillan and Co. 
Pistor, Katharina, 2000, “Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition
Economies,” forthcoming in the European Business Organisation Law Review Vol. 1 Nr. 1.
Reynolds, Thomas H. and Arturo A. Flores, 1989, “Foreign law : current sources of codes and basic
legislation in jurisdictions of the world”,  Littleton, CO : F.B. Rothman.
Sananikone, Ousa, “Burkina Faso” in Webster, Leila, and Peter Fidler, Editors, 1996, "The Informal
Sector and Microfinance Institutions in West Africa," The World Bank, Washington DC.
Schneider, Friedrich, 2000, “The Value Added of Underground Activities: Size and Measurement of
Shadow Economies and Shadow Economy Labor Force All Over the World,” Mimeo, July. 28
Schneider, Friedrich, and Dominik H. Enste, 2000, “Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and
Consequences,” Journal of Economic Literature 38, 77-114.
Shleifer, Andrei , and Robert W. Vishny, 1993, “Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics  108,
599-617.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1998, The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and their
Cures, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
SRI International, 1999, “International Practices and Experiences in Business Startup Procedures,”
Arlington, VA: SRI. 
Stigler, George J., 1971, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and
Management Science II, 3-21.
  Turnham, David, Bernard Salome, and Antoine Schwartz, 1990, "The Informal Sector Revisitied,"
OECD, Paris.
World Bank, 1998, “Constraints to Small Business Development in Georgia,” Private Sector
Assessment Study, Washington, D.C.
World Bank, 1999, “Administrative Barriers to Investment in Africa: The Red Tape Analysis,” FIAS,
Washinton, D.C. 
World Economic Forum (1999), The Global Competitiveness Report 1999, Schwab, Klaus et al., 
eds., New York: Oxford University Press. Table I: List of Procedures for Starting-up a Company
This table provides an exhaustive list of all the procedures required to start-up a company in the seventy-
five countries of the sample.
1. Registration requirements
S Company checks the name for uniqueness
S Company notarizes company deeds
S obtains certificate of compliance with company law
S obtains approval of draft version of company deeds
S plain vanilla notarization
S Company registers at the Companies Registry
S pays registration fee at a separate institution
S registers at a second institution
S submits documents for the record to an institution linked to the Registry
S plain vanilla registration (always present as a step - this is arguably the only truly necessary step
for start-up)
S Company publishes notice of company foundation
S Company opens a bank account and deposits start-up capital
S Company validates documents permitting the opening of a bank account with the start-up
capital or files documents ex-post with the bank so the capital is released
S Company closes capital account and opens a checking account
S plain vanilla opening of a bank account
S Company performs official audit at start-up
S Company complies with additional requirements
S seal and related certificates
S clean criminal record
S right to use business premises and/or office
S certification of marital status
S certificate of competence
S financial plan
S power of attorney when the law requires a professional to perform a given procedure
S statutory authorization of officers
S initial accounts (financial statements)
S notarization of the registration certificate
S registration with customs, even if the company does not export or import
S registration of company bylaws with the tax Authorities, or an id number from the Tax
Authorities for stamp duty purposes
S a declaration regarding investments in kind even if the company has no investments in kind
2. Post -registration requirements
2.1 Municipal-level requirements
S Business license (operations permit) S Local levies
S Inspections (safety, building, fire, sanitation)
S Environmental declaration
S Zoning approval
S Notifications to local authorities
S Approvals by a second authority at the local level (e.g. local people's committee / residents'
committee)
S Notifications to the post-office
S Permit to play music to the public (even if the line of business does not envision any such
activity)
2.2 National level or industry level requirements after registration
S Membership in the Chamber of Commerce or Industry / Regional Trade Association
S Filing with the Statistical bureau / National Business Information Agency
S Filing with the Department/Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of the Economy, or the
respective ministries by line of business
S Signing up with the inter-company clearing mechanism
S Filing with the Ministry of Finance
S Obtaining approval from the Committee for Scrutiny of New Companies
S Miscellaneous government approvals
2.3 Tax-related requirements
S Registration for corporate income tax
S Separate registration for VAT
S Separate registration for state taxes (or other taxes that are neither national nor municipal)
S Sealing / validation / rubricating of accounting books
S Printing and approval of receipts
S Notice of start of activity to the Tax Authorities
S Visit to the bank related to the Tax Authorities
S Designating a bondsman (security) for tax purposes
2.4 Labor-related requirements
S Social security registration
S Separate registration for pensions, which is obligatory by law
S Separate pension registration, which is obligatory by law
S Separate health registration, which is obligatory by law
S Separate accident registration, which is obligatory by law
S Separate unemployment registration, which is obligatory by law
S Separate housing fund registration, which is obligatory by law
S Separate training fund registration, which is obligatory by law
S Inspections regarding work conditions / labor safety / labor standards
S Filing with the Ministry of labor / Employment center (labor exchange)
S Visit to the bank related to the Labor Authorities31
S Arranging automatic withdrawal of the employees’ income tax from the company payroll fundsTable II: The Variables
This table describes the variables collected for the seventy five countries included in our study.  The first
column gives the name of the variable.  The second column describes the variable and provides the sources




The number of different steps that a start-up has to comply with in order to obtain a legal status,
i.e. to start operating as a legal entity. Source: Authors’s own calculations.
Safety & Health
The number of different safety and health procedures that a start-up has to comply with to start
operating as a legal entity.
Environment
The number of different environmental procedures that a start-up has to comply with to start
operating as a legal entity.  
Taxes
The number of different tax procedures that a start-up has to comply with to start operating as
a legal entity. 
Labor
The number of different labor procedures that a start-up has to comply with to start operating
as a legal entity. 
Screening
The number of different steps that a start-up has to comply with in order to obtain a registration
certificate that are not associated with safety and health issues, the environment, taxes, or labor.
Time
The time it takes to become operational, in business days.  The figure is calculated by taking
the time for registration, and adding the time for post-registration procedures. Time is measured
in business days.  Per definition, a week has five business days and a month has twenty two.
Cost
The cost of becoming operational as a share in GNP/capita.  The start-up is assumed to have
a start-up capital of ten times the GNP per capita level in 1997 in the country.
GDP1997 per capita
Gross domestic product per capita in current U.S. dollars in 1997.  Source: World Bank's World
Development Indicators, 1999, Table 1.2. CD Rom 5/2000.
Quality standards
Number of ISO 9000 certifications per thousand inhabitants issued by the International
Organization for Standardization in 1998 to each country in the sample.  “ISO standards
represent an international consensus on the state of the art in the technology concerned....ISO
9000 is primarily concerned with quality management...ISO develops voluntary technical
standards that contribute to making the development, manufacturing and supply of products
and services more efficient, safer and cleaner....ISO standards also serve to safeguard
consumers ....When an organization has a management system certified to an ISO 9000..., this
means that the process influencing quality (ISO 9000) ....conforms to the relevant standard’s
requirements”.  Source:  International Organization for Standardization
Water pollution
Emissions of organic water pollutants (kilograms per day per worker) for 1996. Measured in
terms of biochemical oxygen demand, which refers to the amount of oxygen that bacteria in
water will consume in breaking down waste. Emissions per worker are total emissions divided





Log of the number of deaths caused by accidental poisonings (including by drugs, medications,
bio-products, solid and liquid substances, gases and vapors) per million inhabitants. Average
of the years 1981 through 1994 (the most recent available figure).  Source: The number of
accidental deaths from poisoning is taken from Causes of Death and Life, Birth Statistics,
World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland, 1998.  Population figures are taken from World
Bank's World Development Indicators.
Deaths from
intestinal
Log of the number of deaths caused by intestinal infections (including digestive disorders) per
million inhabitants.  Average of the years 1981 through 1994 (the most recent available figure).Variable Description
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infections Source: The number of deaths from intestinal infections is taken from Causes of Death and Life,
Birth Statistics, World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland, 1998.  Population figures are




Size of the shadow economy as a percentage of GDP (varying time periods).  Source: Authors
owns computations based on averaging over all estimates reported in Schneider and Enste
(1999) for any given country as well as Sananikone (1996) for Burkina Faso,  Chidzero
(1996) for Senegal, Turnham and Schwartz (1990) for Indonesia and Pakistan, and




Share of the labor force employed in the unofficial economy in the capital city of each country
as a percent of the official labor.  Figures are based on surveys and, for some countries, on
econometric estimates. Source:  Schneider  (2000).
Return on assets
Average of the five-year-mean-return-on-asset ratio for all publicly-traded non-financial firms
(i.e., excluding SICs 6000 through 6499) in a given country. Return on assets is defined as the
ratio of gross income to total assets.  Source: WorldScope April 2000 (for all countries except
Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep.,Latvia and Slovenia) and, for countries not on
WorldScope, Claessens, Djankov, and Klingebiel (2000).
Product market
competition
Survey measure of the extent to which respondents agree with the following statement:
“Competition in the local market is intense and market shares fluctuate constantly”.  Scale from
1 (strongly agree) through 7 (strongly disagree).  Source: World Competitiveness Report, 1999.
Corruption index
Corruption perception index for 1999.   Corruption is defined broadly as “the misuse of public
power for private benefits, e.g., bribing of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, or
embezzlement of public funds.”  The index averages the corruption scores given by the
following sources:  (1) Freedom House Nations in Transit (FH); (2) Gallup International (GI); (3)
the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU); (4) the Institute for Management Development, Lausanne
(IMD); (5) the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS); (6) the Political and Economic Risk
Consultancy, Hong Kong (PERC); (7) The Wall Street Journal, Central European Economic
Review (CEER); (8) the World Bank and University of Basel (WB/UB), (9) the World Economic




Index of “operation (de facto) independence of chief executive.”  Descending scale from 1 to
7 (1=pure individual; 2=intermediate category; 3=slight to moderate limitations; 4=intermediate
category; 5=substantial limitations; 6=intermediate category; 7=executive parity or
subordination).  Average of the years 1945 through 1994.  Source:  Polity III.
Constraints on
executive power
Index of constraints on the executive power based on the number of effective veto points in a
country.  Veto points include: (1) an effective legislature (represents two veto points in the case
of bicameral systems); (2) an independent judiciary; and (3) a strong federal system.  Source:
Polcon Database available at <http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/henisz.html>. 
Effectiveness of
legislature
Index of the effectiveness of the legislature.  Ascending scale from 1 to 4 (1=no legislature;
2=largely ineffective; 3=partly effective; 4=effective;).  Average of the years 1945 through 1994.





Index of the competitiveness of the nominating process for seats in the legislature.  Ascending
scale from 1 to 4 (1=no legislature; 2=non-competitive; 3=partly competitive; 4=competitive).
Average of the years 1945 through 1994.  Source:  The Cross-National Time-Series Data
Archive.
Autocracy Indicates the “general closedness of political institutions.” Scale from 0 to 10 with 0 being highVariable Description
in autocracy and 10 being low in autocracy.  Average of the years 1945 through 1994.  Source:
Polity III.
Political rights
Index of political rights. Higher ratings indicate countries that come closer “to the ideals
suggested by the checklist questions of: (1) free and fair elections; (2) those elected rule; (3)
there are competitive parties or other competitive political groupings; (4) the opposition has an
important role and power; and (5) the entities have self-determination or an extremely high
degree of autonomy. Source: Freedom of the World, 1996.
Legal origin
Identifies the legal origin of each Company Law or Commercial Code of each country.  There
are five possible origins: (1) English Common Law; (2) French Commercial Code; (3) German
Commercial Code; (4) Scandinavian Commercial Code; and (5) Socialist/Communist laws.
Source:  La Porta et al. 1998, Reynolds and Flores 1989, CIA World Factbook 1996. Table III: The Data
The table reports the total number of procedures and their breakup in the following five categories: (1) safety and health; (2) environment; (3) taxes;
(4) labor; and (5) screening.  The table also reports the time and direct cost (as a fraction of GDP per capita in 1997) associated with meeting
government requirements as well as the level of GDP per capita in dollars in 1997. Countries are sorted in ascending order on the basis of the total





Environment Taxes Labor Screening Time Cost
GDP1997 per
Capita
Canada 2 0 0 1 0 1 2 0.0140 20,065
Australia 3 0 0 1 0 2 3 0.0209 21,555
New Zealand 3 0 0 1 0 2 17 0.0042 17,188
United States 4 0 0 1 0 3 7 0.0096 29,231
Sweden 4 0 0 1 1 2 17 0.0254 25,736
Ireland 4 0 0 1 1 2 25 0.1145 20,718
Finland 4 0 0 1 2 1 32 0.0119 23,315
Denmark 5 1 0 1 1 2 21 0.0136 32,372
Israel 5 0 0 2 1 2 32 0.2017 16,806
Norway 6 0 0 2 2 2 24 0.0249 34,822
Malaysia 6 0 1 1 1 3 41 0.1723 4,517
Hong Kong 6 1 0 1 1 3 41 0.2467 26,701
Zimbabwe 6 0 0 2 0 4 59 0.5849 731
United Kingdom 7 1 0 2 0 4 11 0.0056 21,748
Panama 7 0 0 1 1 5 14 0.3105 3,229
Latvia 7 0 0 2 0 5 20 0.2774 2,242
South Africa 7 1 0 2 1 3 30 0.3666 3,179
Nigeria 7 0 0 2 1 4 35 0.9927 338
Germany 7 0 0 0 1 6 90 0.0851 25,594
China 7 0 0 1 2 4 111 0.1068 735
Sri Lanka 8 0 0 2 1 5 31 0.0863 814
Lebanon 8 0 0 0 1 7 32 0.3893 3,609
Pakistan 8 0 0 1 2 5 32 0.5333 480
Belgium 8 1 0 1 1 5 42 0.1001 23,800
Taiwan 8 2 0 1 1 4 46 0.0072 13,073
Netherlands 8 0 1 1 0 6 68 0.1902 23,281
Kenya 8 1 0 1 1 5 77 0.3031 358
Kyrgyz Republic 9 0 0 1 1 7 23 0.1997 380
Slovenia 9 0 0 0 1 8 35 0.0709 9,165




Environment Taxes Labor Screening Time Cost
GDP1997 per
Capita
Poland 10 1 0 2 1 6 26 0.2795 3,510
Singapore 10 1 1 1 1 6 36 0.1239 31,036
Thailand 10 0 0 2 2 6 39 0.1025 2,540
Hungary 10 0 0 2 1 7 53 0.8101 4,503
India 10 1 0 2 2 5 61 0.1278 396
Bulgaria 11 0 1 2 0 8 20 0.1652 1,213
Ukraine 11 1 1 1 2 6 21 0.1970 980
Ghana 11 1 1 2 3 4 35 0.1489 383
Korea (South) 11 2 0 0 2 7 46 0.1563 9,622
Japan 11 2 0 2 1 6 50 0.1144 33,292
Senegal 11 0 0 2 3 6 50 0.9956 550
Turkey 11 0 0 2 1 8 55 0.0344 3,038
Romania 11 0 0 2 1 8 68 0.1137 1,545
Spain 11 0 0 2 2 7 83 0.1269 13,499
Czech Republic 11 1 0 1 1 8 97 0.2510 5,050
Italy 11 1 0 3 1 6 121 0.2474 19,912
Indonesia 11 0 1 2 1 7 142 0.2902 1,073
Kazakhstan 12 2 0 1 1 8 31 0.1248 1,403
Georgia 12 2 0 1 1 8 70 0.2797 966
Argentina 12 0 1 3 1 7 71 0.2323 9,110
Chile 12 2 1 4 0 5 78 0.1161 5,272
Switzerland 12 0 1 1 1 9 88 0.1336 36,014
Portugal 12 0 0 2 1 9 99 0.3129 10,185
Slovak Republic 12 1 0 2 2 7 110.5 0.1314 3,615
Ecuador 12 2 0 1 2 7 141 0.1553 1,656
Austria 12 2 1 1 1 7 154 0.4545 25,549
Greece 13 0 0 2 2 9 53 0.4799 11,360
Lithuania 13 3 0 2 2 6 66 0.0550 2,587
Tunisia 13 1 0 1 4 7 66 0.4241 2,055
Burkina Faso 13 0 0 2 2 9 77 1.3336 227
Jordan 13 0 2 2 2 7 81 0.4342 1,581
Croatia 14 1 1 1 3 8 58 0.3405 4,021
Tanzania 14 1 2 2 1 8 77 0.8675 226
Peru 14 1 1 1 4 7 171 0.2142 2,620




Environment Taxes Labor Screening Time Cost
GDP1997 per
Capita
Brazil 15 1 0 5 4 5 67 0.6735 5,012
Mexico 15 2 2 2 3 6 112 0.5742 4,271
Venezuela 15 3 1 2 3 6 124 0.1107 3,841
Egypt 15 0 1 2 2 10 132 2.1608 1,253
Vietnam 15 1 1 1 2 10 171 1.5017 324
France 16 0 0 3 1 12 66 0.1970 23,754
Russia 16 0 0 2 2 12 69 0.3776 3,034
Colombia 17 3 1 1 2 10 55 0.1244 2,391
Mozambique 17 3 0 1 3 10 174 1.1640 90
Bolivia 20 1 1 1 6 11 82 2.6252 1,027
Sample Average 10.17 0.71 0.35 1.55 1.51 6.07 63.05 0.34 9,448
Panel B: Means by Quartiles of GDP per Capita in 1997
1
st Quartile 7.17 0.50 0.22 1.22 0.83 4.39 43.17 0.10 26,588
2
nd Quartile 10.63 0.79 0.42 1.84 1.63 5.95 70.42 0.26 9,080
3
rd Quartile 11.53 0.79 0.32 1.58 1.63 7.21 64.55 0.33 2,437
4
th Quartile 11.21 0.74 0.42 1.53 1.89 6.63 73.00 0.65 589
Panel C: Test of Means (t-Statistics)
1
st vs 2
nd Quartile  -2.95









rd Quartile  -3.94








th Quartile  -3.28








rd Quartile  -0.87 0.00 0.55 0.82 0.00 -1.86









th Quartile 0.29 0.17 -0.55 0.29 -0.69 0.83 -0.57 -1.76
c 9.10
aTable IV: Evidence on the Helping-hand Theory
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using the following six dependent variables: (1) Quality
standards as proxied by the number of ISO9000 certifications; (2) Water pollution; (3) Deaths from accidental
poisoning; (4) Deaths from intestinal infection; (5) Size of the unofficial economy as a fraction of GDP; (3)
Water pollution; and (6) Employment in the unofficial economy.  The independent variables are the number
of procedures and the log of per capita GDP in dollars in 1997.  Table II describes all variables in detail.
Robust standard errors are shown below the coefficients.
Dependent Variable Number of
Procedures









































(0.3114) (0.1412) (1.6357) 60




















(5.5192) (1.3639) (20.5722) 36
1The regression on the size of the unofficial economy controls for the log of GDP per capita plus unofficial economy
income (i.e., GDP per capita*(1+unofficial economy)), and not just by GDP per capita as all other regressions on the table
do. 
Note: 
a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%.  Table V: Evidence on the Capture Theory
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using the following two dependent variables: (1) Return on
assets; and (2) Product market competition.  The independent variables are: (1) Number of procedures (Panel
A); (2) Time (Panel B); and (C) Cost (Panel C).  Each regression is run with and without controlling for the
log of per capita GDP in dollars in 1997.  Table II describes all variables in detail.  Robust standard errors are
shown below the coefficients.
Panel A: Number of Procedures as the Independent Variable
Dependent Variable Number of
Procedures



















(0.1066) (0.0515) (0.6314) 54
Panel B: Time as the Independent Variable


















(0.0521) (0.0484) (0.5637) 54
Panel C: Cost as the Independent Variable



















(0.0368) (0.0516) (0.4241) 54Table VI: Evidence on the Toll-Booth Theory
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using corruption as the dependent variable.   The
independent variables are: (1) the number of procedures;  (2) Time ; (3) Cost; and the log of per capita GDP
in dollars in 1997.  Panel A presents results for the 71 observations with available corruption data.  Panel B
reports results for both the sample of countries with GDP per capita in 1997 above and below the  sample
median.  Table II describes all variables in detail.  Robust standard errors are shown below the coefficients.
Panel A: Results for the whole sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













































2 0.3923 0.7749 0.1913 0.7204 0.3668 0.7145
N 71 71 71 71 71 71
Panel B: Results for Countries above and below the world median GDP per capita 
Countries Above Median GDP/POP97 Countries Below Median GDP/POP97
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
















































2 0.7264 0.6656 0.6711 0.2251 0.2278 0.2260
N 37 37 37 34 34 34
Note: 
a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%.  Table VII: Correlation Table for Political Attributes
































































































































































































































































Effectiveness Legislature 0.9134a 0.8711a 1.0000
Competition Nominating 0.8211a 0.7219a 0.8440a 1.0000
Autocracy 0.8918a 0.8567a 0.8475a 0.7578a 1.0000
Political Rights 0.5352a 0.6140a 0.5993a 0.4246c 0.4800a 1.0000
French  Legal Origin -0.1899 -0.0230 -0.1963 -0.2204 0.0128 -0.0746 1.0000
Socialist Legal Origin -0.3946 -0.4586a -0.3736 -0.3619 -0.5594a -0.0754 -0.4179b 1.0000
German  Legal Origin 0.1832 0.2544 0.2579 0.1797 0.1510 0.2304 -0.2276 -0.1596 1.0000
Scandinavian Legal Orig. 0.3353 0.3367 0.3399 0.2510 0.2979 0.2294 -0.1832 -0.1285 -0.0700 1.0000
English Legal Origin 0.3027 0.1339 0.1520 0.2627 0.2760 -0.0942 -0.4654a -0.3265 -0.1778 -0.1431 1.0000
Ln GDP per cap in 1997 0.6453a 0.7619a 0.7506a 0.6323a 0.6296a 0.6749a -0.0800 -0.2497 0.3316 0.3114 -0.0378 1.0000
Number Procedures -0.5743a -0.4948a -0.5699a -0.4496b -0.4718a -0.2779 0.4680a 0.1881 0.0430 -0.3619 -0.5325a -0.4285b 1.0000
Time Procedures -0.3580 -0.3150 -0.4061 -0.3479 -0.3099 -0.3116 0.4259c 0.0223 0.1365 -0.2108 -0.4635a -0.3053 0.7531a 1.0000
Cost Procedures -0.5103a -0.5419a -0.6318a -0.5233a -0.4669a -0.4303c 0.3280 0.1082 -0.1223 -0.3885c -0.1887 -0.5695a 0.6229a 0.5490a 1.0000
Note: 
a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%.  Table VIII: Evidence on Regulation and Political Attributes
The table presents the results of running regressions for three alternative measures of entry regulation: (1) Number of procedures in Panel A; (2) Time in Panel B; and
(3) Cost in Panel C.  For each dependent variable, we run seven regressions using various political indicators described on Table II and GDP per capita. Robust standard
errors are shown below the coefficients.
Panel A: Number of Procedures as the Dependent Variable
































Ln GDP per capita in 1997
-0.0245 -0.0296 0.0020 -0.0703b -0.0596b -0.1296a -0.1129a
(0.0292) (0.0358) (0.0341) (0.0339) (0.0297) (0.0339) (0.0291)
Constant
3.0035a 2.6684a 2.7804a 3.2373a 3.0971a 3.2776a 2.7534a
(0.2259) (0.2639) (0.2518) (0.2650) (0.2307) (0.2406) (0.2115)
R2 0.3339 0.2490 0.3247 0.2350 0.2473 0.1825 0.6098
N 74 74 64 64 74 74 75Panel B: Time as the Dependent Variable































Ln GDP per capita in 1997
-0.0703 -0.0775 -0.0593 -0.1183c -0.1007c -0.0925 -0.1924a
(0.0524) (0.0688) (0.0592) (0.0609) (0.0548) (0.0743) (0.0606)
Constant
5.0125a 4.6831a 4.9921a 5.4594a 5.0945a 5.0691a 4.7791a
(0.4592) (0.5060) (0.4511) (0.5119) (0.4594) (0.5092) (0.4137)
R2 0.1376 0.1067 0.1691 0.1516 0.1162 0.1094 0.4304
N 74 74 64 64 74 74 75Panel C: Cost as the Dependent Variable































Ln GDP per capita in 1997
-0.3835a -0.3566a -0.2459a -0.3884a -0.4228a -0.4330a -0.4495a
(0.1009) (0.1142) (0.0808) (0.0866) (0.1066) (0.0999) (0.0886)
Constant
2.0911a 1.4327a 1.5079a 2.4780a 2.1974a 2.0978a 1.4291b
(0.6417) (0.8015) (0.5810) (0.6591) (0.6666) (0.6538) (0.6400)
R2 0.3693 0.3613 0.4335 0.3915 0.3548 0.3264 0.4565
N 74 74 64 64 74 74 75






























































































































Figure I.  Start-up procedure in New Zealand.  Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis.  The time required to complete
each procedure is described by the height of the bar and measured against the left scale.  Cumulative costs are plotted using a line and


















































































































Figure II.  Start-up procedure in France.  Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis.  The time required to complete
each procedure is described by the height of the bar and measured against the left scale.  Cumulative costs are plotted using a line and
measured against the right scale.    u
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